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ABSTRACT 
Brian Maves: The European Union as a Military Actor 
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
Since 1999, the European Union has strived to develop a more holistic foreign 
policy apparatus. The EU has always prided itself on its effective use of ‘soft power’ 
means of achieving foreign policy goals; but strife in the Balkans made clear the need for 
‘hard power’ options as well. This paper examines the development of the EU’s ability to 
conduct military operations in crisis situations. It looks at the foreign policy goals set 
forth in the 2003 European Security Strategy and what steps the EU has taken to attain 
them from a military standpoint. The potential benefits of the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation clause in the Treaty of Lisbon are addressed. As are the limitations placed on 
any potential CSDP military operation due to the lack of a unified command and control 
infrastructure in the EU. 
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Introduction 
 
In the modern international system, the European Union occupies a unique 
position. Its integration of civilian and military power gives it the ability to act as a 
multilateral strategic actor for the promotion of human security12. However, the 
organization itself has many hindrances keeping it from its true potential. What are these 
hindrances and how has the EU begun to address them? This paper will be an 
examination of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and its ability to 
conduct military operations.  
The CSDP3 was founded in 1999 in response to the inability of the EU to handle 
the war in Kosovo. The EU had originally intended to take the lead in stabilizing the 
situation in the Balkans and assert itself independently of NATO and the United States. 
After repeated failures to reach consensus on appropriate action and inability to muster 
the necessary military capabilities, the EU was forced to rely once again on its 
transatlantic relationship with the US to handle a crisis situation located ostensibly in 
Europe’s backyard. The CSDP was created to address these shortcomings: proving the 
EU with the necessary cohesion and tools to handle high-intensity military situations. 
                                                 
1
 Human security is a rejection of the view of security espoused by realist theory. The EU and its CSDP is 
not a defensive security organization; it leaves that responsibility to NATO. The CSDP is organized to 
improve European security by stabilizing the ‘neighborhood’ surrounding it. This is accomplished through 
the generalized goals of promoting human rights, the spread of democracy and the rule of law.  
2
 Matlary 2006: 108 
3
 Formally known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Interesting, at the time of its 
founding, many of the member-states explicitly wanted to avoid the term “Common” from appearing in the 
title. The proposed name had been Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP). 
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How far has the EU progressed in this regard? In ten years, has it gained the strength 
necessary to have acted in the Kosovo crisis?  
This paper will argue no. The CSDP has progressed much since its original 
founding, but it is still not capable of operating as a autonomous, strategic military actor. 
This is not to say the EU is incapable of acting militarily. It certainly can and has done so 
successfully several times in the short history of the CSDP. Yet, these have all been 
relatively low-risk operations with small personnel deployments and limited goals. Steps 
have been made in improving the ability of the EU to engage in high-risk military 
operations4, but the fundamental problems in the institution and its capabilities prevent it 
from doing so presently.  
Chapter 1 will outline the general goals and strategies of the CFSP/CSDP 
developed in the European Security Strategy. It will also examine the complex 
institutional process that must be conducted in order to conduct military operations. 
Chapter 2 will examine the current status of the EU’s military capabilities, demonstrating 
the shortcomings that prevent the EU from being an autonomous actor. Thus far, the EU 
has been able to act militarily; but only through close associations with international 
organizations like NATO and the UN. For the EU to be an autonomous actor, it must be 
able to conduct these missions independent of assistance. This paper will also address 
how the EU is attempting to develop those capabilities to be a more effective actor in the 
international community.  
 
                                                 
4
 A high-risk situation would be intervening in an active war zone or civil conflict. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
European Security Strategy – What is the Purpose of CSDP? 
 
 The European Security Strategy (ESS) was drafted in 2003 and adopted by the 
European Council later in that same year. It sets forth a series of security challenges facing 
Europe and outlines a strategy in which to address them. Since its adoption, it has formed the 
template on which all further development in the CSDP has been based. 
 The document outlines a series of global challenges that face Europe today. Among 
these are poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and conflict. Many of these are not 
challenges that actually exist within the EU itself, but the continent is still vulnerable to the 
problems they can cause. The world is becoming increasingly globalized and Europe is a 
large factor in that transition. Gone are the days when crisis in one part of the world could be 
effectively quarantined from having an effect on another. Europe is particularly vulnerable: it 
sits in close proximity to some of the more turbulent regions of the world.  
 Europe faces its own challenges as well. It has experienced recent conflict on its 
periphery and has seen the devastation it can cause. It is also dependent on other regions of 
the globe in order to sustain its way of like. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and 
natural gas, most of which comes from turbulent areas of the globe1. This dependency is 
projected to grow in the coming decades, which may require Europe to take an more active 
                                                 
1
 ESS 2003: 3 
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role in addressing the challenges facing these vital regions if it wishes to provide a secure 
future for itself2.  
It is interesting that the ESS does not stress the possibility of territorial threats for the 
continent. Yet, Europe does face a number of tangible threats: terrorism, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. 
Many of these threats are directly related. Regional conflict and failed states can create 
environments that give rise to terrorism, organized crime, and the proliferation of WMDs. In 
turn, terrorism and organized crime threaten the internal security of Europe. These are threats 
that move across borders, conducting illegal activities and subverting the ability of the state 
maintain law and order. The proliferation of WMDs makes the need to combat terrorism all 
the more important, as the damage that could be inflicted by an attack could be enormous. 
The integrated nature of these threats requires the EU to take a comprehensive and varied 
approach to address international security.  
 In order to effectively handle crisis situations, the ESS outlines a series of policy 
objectives that will allow the EU to “develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and 
when necessary, robust intervention”3. The first is to pursue polices that make the EU more 
capable. This includes military forces that are more flexible, mobile, efficient and 
resourceful. It identifies the need for pooled and shared military assets to reduce 
redundancies, overhead, and increase capabilities.  
                                                 
2
 Recent activity in Libya may attest to this. 
3
 ESS 2003: 10 
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 The ESS also claims the need to develop more coherence in CFSP and CSDP, 
claiming “we are stronger when we act together”4. This includes the need to increase 
coherence between EU institutions and member-state governments, increase coherence 
between various EU institutions, and developing a unity of command which will allow for 
the EU to effectively respond to crisis situations. 
 Unfortunately, the ESS is a vague document. It recommends goals that the CSDP 
should try to achieve, but not how to achieve them. It does not recommend any specific 
policies that should be pursued, nor how its recommendations could manifest themselves in 
reality. The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to examining the process the EU must 
undertake in order to commit itself to military action.  
How Does the CSDP Military Action Work? 
 CFSP decision-making and the choice to use military action in the CSDP are based 
around the prerogatives of the 27 individual member-stats of the EU. In the European 
Council, votes are taken amongst representatives of the member-states to decide what actions 
will be taken to address emerging crisis situations. For the EU to conduct any military 
operation, there must be unanimity among the member-states in favor of action. A vote 
against the use of force by any member-state will scuttle any planned military operation. 
There is some flexibility in this arrangement: member-states can chose to abstain from the 
vote. By abstaining, a member-state agrees that the mission can be conducted under the 
banner of the EU; but they will not lend any support to it. This means they are not going to 
provide personnel, equipment or funding. They are simply agreeing not to stand in the way of 
what the majority of the member-states are willing to do. So long as the weighted votes of the 
                                                 
4
 ESS 2003: 13 
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abstaining member-states does not eclipse 1/3 of the total votes, a military action can 
proceed. Before the Council even begins to deliberate on voting for military action, there is 
an complicated institutional apparatus providing the national representatives with the 
information necessary to make an informed decision about the situation. 
 The build-up to the vote in the Council is largely an informal process, especially 
when it comes to launching a military operation5. This is due to the questions surrounding 
EU capabilities and competences. EU operations are always constructed on ad hoc basis. The 
first discussion must always be whether the EU has the authority to launch an operation. The 
EU has sought both legal and political legitimacy for any planned action. The United Nations 
Security Council grants legal legitimacy through the approval of a UN mandate. This has 
been a pre-requisite for all EU action thus far. This vote also grants a international political 
support, which is bolstered by the multinational nature of the EU itself. Depending on the 
theatre, the EU may also seek the endorsement of the Arab League6, ASEAN, or the African 
Union. Multinational support is one of the guiding principles of the ESS. This is especially 
important because most EU military operations have taken place in countries that were once 
a part of European empires. EU military actions could be viewed as renewed imperialist 
efforts if they lacked international support7. 
 The second discussion is whether the EU is the proper organization to conduct the 
operation. The EU will defer to the UN in terms of military operations. The UN has the 
backing of a much larger portion of the world’s governments and people, which lends greater 
                                                 
5
 Missiroli 2005: 66 
6
 For instance, the EU received Arab League support for military action in Libya. 
7
 These charges have been leveled despite the fact that EU operations had a UNSC endorsement. 
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legitimacy to its actions. It also has more resources at its immediate disposal than the EU, 
which is dependent entirely on what the member-states are willing to provide. The EU is 
more than willing to play a supporting role in UN operations and has done so in the past; 
including the continuation of peacekeeping operations after the period of UN involvement in 
a region has expired8.  
 The EU will also defer to NATO. As a result of the Berlin Plus agreement9, NATO 
has the right of first refusal to carry out UNSC mandates. In return for this concession, the 
EU is granted access to NATO assets, capabilities, and planning infrastructures. This 
arrangement is shrouded in uncertainty about when NATO will act and when it will not; but 
it really is a matter of what the priorities of the United States are. NATO is more likely to 
become involved in operations conducted in the Middle East, Asia, or the Persian Gulf 
because of the priorities of Washington in those regions. In other areas, particularly Africa, it 
is likely that NATO will differ to the EU in conducting operations10. Once NATO declines to 
carry out a UNSC mandate, it becomes the prerogative of the EU to conduct the military 
operation. 
 Once it is decided the EU will conduct an operation, a complex set of informal 
negotiations are conducted to determine the details. The EU has to figure out which member-
states will participate, what resources they are willing to provide, and who will take the lead. 
Several committees and institutions within the EU itself aid these informal negotiations. The 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) delivers opinions to the national representatives on 
                                                 
8
 EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 was a military operation in support of UN forces already in the country. 
9
 Originally between the Western European Union and later incorporated into the EU itself. 
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the European Council concerning the international political situation surrounding the crisis. It 
also helps define the EU’s response. The PSC assesses the EU’s interests and objectives in 
the crisis and recommends to the Council a proper course of action. This mainly concerns 
whether the EU should launch an operation at all and whether it should be civilian or 
military. 
The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) becomes involved in the planning 
for a potential military operation. It is staffed by military representatives from the member-
states and gives military advice to the PSC. This advice is incorporated into the PSC’s final 
recommended course of action. The EUMC also provides military direction to the European 
Union Military Staff (EUMS), which provides advice on the technical aspects of pre-
planning a military operation11.  
These committees are coordinated by the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign and Security Policy (HR). The HR chairs the PSC, which draws upon the advice of 
the EUMC. It also receives direct consultation from the EUMS. This allows the HR to draw 
upon the military and political expertise within the EU to coordinate with national 
representatives from the member-states and the European Commission. This is important 
because only the Commission and the member-states themselves have the right of initiative 
to propose a military operation in the Council12. 
 Other than the right of initiative, the Commission has very little further influence on 
CSDP military operations. It does have control of the CFSP budget, along with the European 
Parliament; but the EU does very limited direct budgeting for military operations. EU 
                                                 
11
 These institutions generally house liaisons with NATO, allowing for better coordination between the two. 
12
 The Commission has never exercised this right. 
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funding only concerns the pre-planning stages of a military operation, which happens at the 
EU level anyways. This lack of control from both the Commission and the European 
Parliament has led to concerns over the democratic legitimacy and control of EU military 
action; but this is a complaint inherent to the EU in general. Regardless, national 
representatives, voted for indirectly by the citizenry, are the fundamental planners and 
executors of EU military policy. 
 Organizing a EU military operation is an extremely difficult task because of this 
informal process. The potential operations the EU has a choice to conduct are usually the less 
desirable ones politically because of NATO’s right of first refusal on UNSC mandates. 
Therefore, there is a lot of hesitancy from the member-states towards conducting military 
operations. This made even more difficult because of the unanimity that is required to launch 
an expedition. The 27 member-states have 27 different sets of foreign policy goals and 
preferences. Finding a common platform among them is extremely difficult, especially when 
something as divisive as military operations is considered.  
Recently, the EU has attempted to address these difficulties with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
It has created new institutions and positions designed to increase the coordination and 
cohesion amongst the EU and its member-states in regards to foreign policy. It has expanded 
the powers and responsibilities of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and 
Security Policy, created the new position of President of the European Council, and founded 
the European External Action Service. All of which are designed to create a more coherent 
and cohesive foreign policy agenda for the EU. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Military Capabilities of the CSDP 
 
 The EU has three major obstacles in trying to conduct a high-risk military operation 
from a capabilities standpoint. First, it does not have access to the personnel and equipment 
necessary to project intense force outside the European theatre. This is due in part to the lack 
of capabilities of the member-states themselves or their unwillingness to make those 
capabilities available for EU operations. Second, member-state militaries are inadequate for 
conduct operations outside of their territorial boundaries. Most of member-state personnel 
and equipment is designed for territorial defense rather than force projection. This is a 
holdover from the Cold War era, but still has a predominant place in the mindset of most 
member-state military establishments. Third, the European defense industry is fractured and 
disjointed. The state of the European defense industry causes wasteful spending and 
redundant development programs; leading to inefficient and ineffective defense budgets that 
are not improving the military capabilities of the continent. This problem is doubly important 
for member-state militaries attempting to transition from Cold War era forces into modern 
armed forces. 
The EU has no army with which to the conduct military operations of the CSDP. It 
also has no direct mechanism to fund long-term military research and development, 
equipment procurement, personnel training, or personnel deployment costs. It is totally 
dependent on its member-states to fulfill these roles and make CSDP initiatives a reality. 
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Since 1999, when the CSDP was first established, the goal of the EU has been to increase the 
coordination of its member-states so that they might better utilize defense spending and 
increase the efficiency of operational deployments. This chapter will examine the changes 
that have occurred since 1999. It will also address the long-term implications of a possible 
build-up of EU strategic military capabilities. Leading into the discussion of how the Lisbon 
Treaty has positioned the EU to become a more strategic actor in the future. 
Skeptics have long claimed the EU is incapable of effective military action. This 
belief is founded on the declining defense budgeting in EU member-states, their inability to 
keep pace with the technological curve, and the growth capabilities gap between them and 
the United States1. They claim that without NATO, the EU lacks the capabilities and 
infrastructure to launch successful military campaigns. At the moment, the EU does lack the 
ability to operate many of the missions NATO was originally designed to conduct. Yet, the 
EU is not trying to duplicate NATO's mission prerogatives. It focuses on a different set of 
crisis management situations and tries to resolve them in a way that is distinctly separate 
from that of NATO. The two organizations certainly have overlapping goals and concerns, 
but the founding of the CSDP made it quite clear that it was not concerned with maters 
regarding Article 5 of the NATO charter (the collective defense clause). Rather, EU is 
interested in conducting the tasks concerned with peacekeeping and humanitarian concerns; 
tasks, which do not require the same level of military advancement and sophistication, found 
in the United States or NATO2.  
                                                 
1
 Biscop 2004: 510 
2
 Biscop 2004: 511 
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The United States has been consistently urging European members of NATO to 
develop more sophisticated military technology and training. Washington is tired of footing 
the bill for European defense and desires a partnership in which Europe provides its own 
security. It would also like Europe to shoulder more of the burden for managing crises in the 
international community, especially in zones of EU interest. The EU has more than adequate 
personnel to accomplish the tasks it has established for itself. The question it must address in 
the future is: how can it modernize its military in ways that increase capabilities, 
effectiveness, and maximize budget spending? 
 The EU has no central budget for military operations expenditures. This has proven to 
be a major deterrent to conducting crisis management operations thus far. Instead of the EU 
funding the costs of crisis management operations, there is a 'costs fall where they may' 
system that places all financial onuses on the individual member-state. In this system, the 
member-state must pay for everything they are individually responsible for in an ad hoc 
manner. It should be apparent why member-states would not want to conduct crisis 
management operations with such a system in place. Currently, not only are they responsible 
for providing the troops and equipment necessary to conduct EU operations, but they are also 
directly responsible for paying for those operations as well.  
 The current system creates a disjointed EU that is incapable of projecting solidarity 
during military operations. Member-states are unwilling to foot the bill for their portion of an 
operation simply opt-out, leaving others to cover all operational costs. Yet, those member-
states that do opt-out still reap the benefits of increased security that CSDP operations are 
designed to achieve. This creates a potential free-rider problem in which there are actual 
incentives for states not to participate in CSDP operations. This generates animosity in the 
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EU when some member-states feel as though others are taking them advantage of them. It 
also weakens the multilateral legitimacy of EU operations when member-states opt-out of 
involvement. 
` In a way, the individual member-states that do participate must pay for EU operations 
in three different ways: the political fallout from sending personnel in conflict zones, the 
wear and tear on all equipment provided, and the actual cost of conducting operations. In this 
setting, it is no wonder that many states have been unwilling to conduct any CSDP 
operations, placing the burden on others in the union3. This system is currently capable of 
working with states like Britain and France willing to cover most of the costs of CSDP 
operations, but this may not be the case in the future. As fiscal restraints weigh more heavily 
on European states, more balanced burden sharing may become essential for the future 
conduct of CSDP military operations. 
 The EU has attempted to address this problem, but the solution is wanting. In 2005, 
the Athena mechanism was created to help offset some of the costs associated with CSDP 
operations. These funds are typically used for pre-deployment activities (created command 
and control infrastructure, etc.) and only cover about 10 percent of the total cost of an 
operation; these are costs the EU would have to provide for anyways. Thus, they have not 
proven to be an incentive enough for member-states to be more willing participants in CSDP 
activities. They also do nothing to address the more hidden costs these operations: political 
liabilities (which cannot be overcome with money), equipment degradation, and personnel 
costs.  
                                                 
3
 Or choosing to simply not conduct an operation at all. 
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 The Athena mechanism also does not provide any funds for the procurement of 
necessary equipment; this is left solely to the discretion of the member-state. This paper will 
discuss the various capabilities the EU needs to acquire in order to be an efficient and 
effective strategic actor; but as of yet, the EU has no direct way to acquire these capabilities. 
Even if the EU can convince member-states to acquire these needed capabilities, it must then 
convince them to allow the EU to have access. This is easier said than done. After purchasing 
expensive military hardware, the last thing most member states want to do is loan it to the EU 
for a peacekeeping mission someplace far from European borders. Especially since it will be 
the member-state that must cover the costs of operating and maintaining that equipment. As a 
result of these funding concerns, CSDP missions have tended to be very limited in both scope 
and deployment. 
 Collectively, the 27 member-states of the EU have access to about 2 million military 
personnel; however, only around 100,000 are available at any given time for deployment 
outside of Europe. The shortcomings with these available troops are numerous. First, many 
of them are conscripted members of the military: part-timer personnel who lack the 
experience and training to conduct CSDP operations. Conscripted troops are generally less 
effective and more costly to maintain than a volunteer army. Yet, many European countries 
still use conscription as a means of bolstering the personnel numbers of their armed forces. 
This is a holdover from the Cold War era, when it was believed that all mass numbers of 
troops would be needed to defend against an invasion from the Soviet Union4. These huge 
troop numbers are simply not needed to conduct the modern intervention missions conducted 
by Western countries. Even if they were, conscripted soldiers are generally unfit to conduct 
anything but rudimentary territorial defense, which has become an antiquated pursuit. It is 
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also extremely expensive to pay for and maintain such a huge number of personnel. This 
means that many European countries are spending large portions of their defense budgets to 
maintain soldiers that are incapable of conducting the security operations required of them in 
the modern world. 
 Second, most of the personnel available on paper have skills that are holdover from 
the Cold War mentality of Europe: focusing mainly on territorial defense. These skills are 
unsuitable for peacekeeping operations. Military personnel needs to be re-trained with 
policing, administration, and construction skills in mind if they are to be useful for 
international CSDP operations. Thus far, most European countries seem unwilling or unable 
to re-train their personnel adequately. As of 2008, the EU was able to muster less than 3000 
military personnel with the training needed to conduct police-training missions, despite the 
previously stated need to train more. The complications, which result from personnel that are 
under-staffed and under-trained, can be seen in the political fallout of police-training 
missions in Bosnia where corruption, improper behavior, and inefficient training became 
widespread.  These redundancies also complicate the ability of personnel from different 
member-states to work in unison as a multinational force.  
Third, many of them lack the equipment necessary to conduct efficient and effective 
operations. As of 2006, the average EU member-state spends 20 002 euros per soldier on 
equipment. 21 member-states actual spend substantially less per soldier. Compare this to the 
United States which spends well over $100 000 on equipment procurement for each of its 
soldiers5. There is also a huge disparity between what the top three European countries spend 
per soldier and the rest of the Union, exacerbating the fear of free riding held by some 
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member-states. Much of the equipment that is procured for many of European soldiers is 
outdated and incapable of interoperating with the equipment used by other member-states. If 
the EU wants to be able to field a cohesive and effective military force in the future, it will 
need to standardize the training and equipment European soldiers receive. It is impossible for 
a military force to be effective if there are large disparages between the each soldier or field 
unit. 
The Europe must address all of these deficiencies in its military capabilities in order 
for the EU to become an effective military actor. It must do this in an environment in which 
budgetary constraints are decreasing defense spending while the costs of military acquisitions 
continue to increase. To be successful, the EU must better coordinate military planning and 
procurement between its members to extract the most value per euro spent. Most of CSDP 
policy changes since 1999 have been designed to foster this needed cooperation. 
 
Attempts by the EU to Assemble an Available Military Force 
 
 The first step in assembling a usable EU military force was establishing a set of 
'Headline Goals' at the Helsinki European Council in December of 1999. The Headline Goals 
set to establish the capabilities and infrastructure needed for the EU to be able to deploy a 
military force of 60000 troops within 60 days, which could be sustained for an entire year. A 
series of councils and committees were established to assess the types of capabilities the EU 
would need to have access to in order to conduct such a military operation. Then a call was 
put forth to the member-states asking them to volunteer the forces and equipment needed to 
fulfill those capabilities. The result was the Helsinki Force Catalogue: a literal catalogue of 
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100000 personnel, 400 aircraft, and 100 naval craft the EU could draw upon to conduct its 
military operations.  
However, these forces are insufficient to achieve the benchmarks set forth in the 1999 
Headline Goals. As of today, Europe still does not have the ability to field a 60 000 member 
military force and sustain them for 60 days. Rather than continuing to build toward that goal, 
the response of the EU has been to lower expectations; while replacing greater military 
integration with an unending series of committees designed to address the problem6. 
 Perhaps in response to the realization that fielding the European Rapid Response 
force is nothing more than a pipe dream; EU leaders have turned their attention to smaller, 
more reasonable forms of European military integration. These are trying to be addressed in 
the 'battlegroup' initiative created as a part of the 'Headline Goals'. These battlegroups are 
intended to create easily deployable military personnel with access to necessary air and naval 
equipment. Each would contain 1500 personnel, along with the air and naval craft needed to 
support them, would be able to launch an operation within 10 days and be able to sustain that 
mission for 120 days7.  
These battlegroups are designed to be small because it is hoped that smaller units will 
be more manageable and foster increased integration between the units. They are not 
designed to actually handle an operation on their own; rather, they buy the EU time to 
assemble the forces adequate to actually handle the situation. The history of CSDP military 
intervention has demonstrated that it takes the EU quite a bit of time to assemble the 
                                                 
6
 Witney 2008 
7
 Thus far, there are two operational battlegroups available to the EU. Neither has ever been deployed. 
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necessary personnel and material to respond to a crisis8. This allows the situation on the 
ground to deteriorate even further, making any intervention that much more difficult. The 
goal of the EU battlegroups is to respond to a situation rapidly, keep it from falling any 
further into chaos, and buy the EU the time necessary to assemble a task force.  
 EU battlegroups can be formed in three different ways. The first is that a country with 
enough military resources can create one. At the moment, only France and Britain have the 
requisite military personnel, equipment, and funding to do so. The second is to allow for a 
'framework' country to provide the foundation for the creation of a battlegroup. This would 
allow a country like Germany or Italy to provide most of the needed materials, while smaller 
countries fill in the personnel and equipment gaps. The third option is for several countries to 
cooperate in order to complete a single battlegroup. Battlegroups allow for the EU to more 
rapidly, and completely, deploy the forces necessary to conduct a CSDP operation. Without 
their creation, the EU must approach members in an ad hoc basis, which is both times 
consuming and ineffective. Since battlegroups are pre-made, they lack the capability gaps 
that are created when the EU is forced to assemble a new force for each operation. In 
addition, two of these options require the interoperability of EU members' militaries in order 
to be successful. This helps to build cooperation among member-state militaries and helps 
address some of the European capability shortfalls: each can see what resources the other 
lacks and can work jointly to address and develop them. 
 
                                                 
8
 It took more than eight months for EU leaders to assemble the 2400 personnel needed to assist the UN in 
monitoring elections in the Congo. 
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EU Equipment and Capabilities Shortcomings 
 
 The equipment and capabilities shortcomings in the EU are numerous. First, EU 
member-states have far too many tanks and combat aircraft. As of today, there are still 
around 10,000 operational main battle tanks and 3000 combat aircraft in Europe, mostly in 
the eastern edges of the EU9. These numbers are redundant and far exceed the actual number 
needed for territorial defense. This is a result of the disjointed and nationalistic approach 
European member-states have taken towards defense planning. At the moment, there are 
more than a dozen separate armies, navies, and air forces operating on the continent10. Each 
is designed to have the same basic capabilities and achieve the same basic goals. If there 
were more pooling of defense resources, many of these redundant units could be eliminated. 
This would free up personnel and financial resources, allowing them to be applied to 
updating European militaries to meet the challenges of the modern world.  
Second, there is an overwhelming lack of transport planes available to the EU. This 
makes it difficult for the EU to behave as a strategic actor because it cannot get the necessary 
troops and equipment into the theater of action. The EU has been forced to rent C-17 
transport planes from NATO and the Ukraine at huge costs, typically more than $250 000 a 
day for each plane. The European states are attempting to alleviate this problem by 
purchasing A400M transport planes from Airbus; but frequent delays have prevented any 
aircraft from being delivered11. It is thought that the earliest any of these planes could go into 
service will be in late 2012, at the earliest. Until the EU develops adequate resources for the 
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transport of troops and equipment, it will always be at the mercy of foreign powers to project 
power outside of the continent. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of air-to-air refueling 
planes12. The EU also lacks capable helicopters with which to conduct inter-theatre 
operations. Although there are plenty of military helicopters in Europe; very few of them are 
capable of operating outside of the continent13. In an embarrassing display of the EU's lack of 
equipment, it took weeks of negotiation between Javier Solana and the individual heads of 
state for the EU to acquire the 10 helicopters it felt were necessary to conduct operations in 
Yugoslavian crisis. Each of these shortcomings hinders the ability of the EU to project force 
into the necessary theatres of operation outside of Europe.  
Third, the EU lacks access to capable naval vessels. Although Britain and France 
have jointly provided an aircraft carrier, there is a distinct lack of the full-range of vessels 
needed to maritime operations1415. More effective pooling of military equipment could 
increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations while reducing the costs of deployment 
and maintenance of those forces. 
 The problem centers around the distinctly national-focus of EU member-states' 
defense planning and spending. EU members only spend roughly 20 percent of their defense 
procurement on collaborative projects16. This results in massive redundancies, which reduces 
military effectiveness and results in incompatibility between personnel from different 
countries. Since the CSDP must operate as a multinational force, this is a major burden in 
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any attempted operation. For instance, a 2005 study found that EU members spend roughly a 
third of what the United States does on buying equipment; but spends it on roughly three 
times the number of programs17. Better coordination between EU member-states would allow 
them to allocate resources on equipment and development programs that would increase the 
interoperability of their militaries, reduce the cost of R&D, and decrease the cost of 
procurement. 
 One example of the waste and redundancy in European military research and 
development is the creation of the next generation combat fighter aircraft. In Europe, there 
are three different types of combat aircraft being developed: the French Rafale, the Swedish 
Gripen, and a four-nation collaboration on the Eurofighter. These are three separate R&D 
projects designed to create an aircraft with similar capabilities and purpose. They have cost 
an estimated 29.93 billion euros thus far and have received orders for about 1000 units 
combined (The Eurofighter has received the most: around 620; followed by the Rafale at 294 
and the Gripen at 204)18. All this for an aircraft that has limited application for the types of 
military operations that Europe is currently conducting. Especially since the EU lacks access 
to the air-to-air refueling planes necessary to conduct long-range air missions; including the 
enforcement of no-fly zones. Without air-to-air refueling planes, combat aircraft are only 
suited for limited-range territorial defense. 
Concurrently, the United States is also developing a next generation fighter aircraft 
known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This project has cost an estimated 31 billion euros, 
slightly more than the three European projects combined, and has orders for more than 3000 
                                                 
17
 Grevi, Keohane 2010: 82 
18
 Hartley 2003: 110 
  
 22
units, more than the three European projects. If all the European nations had combined their 
programs together, there would have been savings in terms of R&D, learning, and economies 
of scale. The cost per unit of purchasing 1000 combat aircraft would be substantially lower 
than the cost of purchasing limited units of three separate aircraft. In addition, the 
conglomeration of industry would allow for the European defense market to operate on a 
closer scale with that of the United States19. This would provide valuable learning for a 
European defense industry that desperately needs to modernize to compete globally with the 
United States.  
The separate combat aircraft projects are just one example of European R&D 
redundancy, but there are multiple just like it; for instance, there are over 20 different 
programs currently operating to develop the next generation of light armored vehicle. 20 
redundant R&D operations designed to create a vehicle that will all serve the same essential 
purpose with the same capabilities. This type of wastage is unacceptable if the EU is going to 
be able to modernize its military to fit the needs of modern armed conflict. 
 
The European Defense Agency 
 
 The European Defense Agency (EDA) was created in June of 2003 to address the 
equipment shortcomings in EU military capabilities. The EDA has three primary tasks: 
“harmonizing military requirements; coordinating defense research and development (R&D); 
and encouraging the convergence of national procurement procedures”20. It is designed to 
create a comprehensive framework through which member-states can better cooperate on 
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cross-border military equipment projects while reducing the costs of procuring and operating 
it. The major shortcoming of the EDA is that it has no ability to force countries to abide by 
the framework it establishes; it can only recommend and guide. If it were given stronger 
powers by the member-states, it could help coordinate joint R&D projects. These joint 
projects could help eliminate the wasteful redundancies apparent in the combat fighter and 
light armored vehicle programs that permeate Europe. The EDA could also help target 
funding towards projects that actually address the capability necessities of the EU; rather 
than the current system, which caters to the desires of the member-states. It is an important 
step forward towards better CSDP coordination despite this major weakness. 
 The EDA could also help in creating a single defense market in Europe. Despite the 
fact the EU was originally founded to create a common, single market in Europe, this has 
never been applied to the defense industry. As a result, defense markets remain fiercely 
nationalistic and inefficient. With a more open defense industry, Europe could save billions 
by promoting open competition between bidders on national contracts. This system could 
even be spread to allow international firms, allowing even more firms to bid on contracts and 
reducing the price of equipment for European states. There is a precedent for this in the 
western world: the United States has recently allowed international firms to bid on defense 
contracts and even awarded Airbus the contract to build air-to-air refueling tankers2122. 
 The EDA has attempted to lay the foundation for a common defense market. The 
most notable example for this is the creation of a webpage in which a select portion of 
national defense contracts is listed, allowing for firms across Europe to bid on them. In its 
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limited scope, the website has been successful: listing contracts worth more then 300 million 
euros across Europe since its creation. However, this is a minor portion of the over 200 
billion euros EU member-states spend annually on defense. Applying this framework to all 
defense spending would be beneficial not just to the EU, but the member-states themselves: 
allowing access to better technology at cheaper costs.   
The problem is that there is no monopoly on defense spending in Europe: there are 27 
monopolies. For this to work, EU member-states will need to surrender sovereignty over 
equipment procurement to the EDA so that it can force European defense firms to 
consolidate from a position of strength. With a monopoly on defense spending in Europe, the 
EDA could force defense firms to consolidate to improve efficiency; as was done in the 
United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s. Many European 
defense firms are able to survive because they are protected by their national government. 
This allows them to survive despite inefficient business practices. It also prevents them from 
accruing the necessary resources to conduct cutting-edge R&D programs. Vesting more 
power and responsibility into a supranational organization like the EDA may be one way of 
consolidating the European defense market and ‘trimming the fat’ of inefficient firms. 
 
Military Reforms in the Lisbon Treaty 
 
 The most important innovation in the Treaty of Lisbon regarding a new defense 
policy concerns Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC). The permanent structured 
cooperation is a collection of the member-state governments in the European Union “whose 
military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments 
to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions' (Treaty of Lisbon, 
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Articles 28A.6 and 28E)”23. This should allow the EU to more effectively execute the 
Petersburg tasks through the use of military intervention when necessary. The Petersburg 
tasks are the types of military actions the EU has deemed lawful and appropriate. They 
include: joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict 
prevention and post-conflict stabilization missions; as well as combating terrorism by 
providing development support to third-world countries24.  
 The PSC’s main strength is its flexibility25. Each member-state can chose to opt-into 
the program. This could allow the PSC to grow in a piecemeal fashion: picking up countries 
in an ad hoc basis. This will allow those countries that want to move forward with greater 
defensive coordination to do so, despite the protestations of the traditional power players in 
Europe26. The hope is that smaller countries will join at first while larger countries, like 
Britain and France, continue to maintain total sovereignty over their security. Once enough 
of the smaller countries join into the PSC, its benefits and importance in the EU will become 
apparent to larger and larger countries.  
 Eventually, there is the potential that the PSC could become so beneficial that even 
Britain and France could not afford to stay outside of it27. Countries participating in the PSC 
will save massive amounts of money due to increased coordination between them. Increased 
coordination will allow them to eliminate redundancies and decrease total forces: by pooling 
their militaries, these countries can defend themselves on the cheap. The pooling of military 
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spending will also allow for the creation of economies of scale, allowing the EU to purchase 
more capabilities for less money28. As countries throughout Europe are desperately looking 
for ways to decrease government spending, the ability to save money in defense may be too 
tempting for them to pass up. 
 
Command and Control Infrastructure 
 
 The reforms in the Treaty of Lisbon do not go far enough to enable the EU to act as a 
true strategic actor militarily. The treaty does not establish a permanent command and control 
(C2) infrastructure in the EU. Without such organization, it is highly unlikely that the EU 
will be able to respond quickly and robustly to emerging crisis throughout the world. There 
are numerous benefits for the member-states in creating a permanent C2. This section of the 
paper will examine what those benefits are and how they will enable the EU to become a true 
strategic actor. 
 It is important to note that the creation of a EU C2 would not undermine or 
supplement NATO as a defensive security organization29. Despite the fact that they would 
have similar global security objectives, an EU C2 would have its own “format, rationale and 
legitimacy to act for security”30. The EU and the United States have shown different 
preferences for courses of action when dealing with strategic crisis, as well as different 
methods for stabilizing trouble zones. As a result, the EU needs its own autonomous C2 
structure in order to properly pursue its own vision of strategic action. 
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 At the moment, the EU is handicapped from action due to its lack of a command and 
control infrastructure. If the EU identifies a crisis, it has several options for setting up a 
temporary C2; but there are major downsides to these approaches. The first is that the EU can 
use existing NATO command and control structures as part of the Berlin Plus agreement. 
These two organizations have different decision-making processes in the planning for any 
intervention, which can cause costly delays for any action31. The EU utilized this approach to 
intervene in Bosnia in 2004 and it took nearly eight months for any action to be made. 
Utilizing NATO C2 structures also places any potential EU CSDP decision into the undue 
influence of non-member-states3233. It also gives NATO the right of first refusal on any 
UNSC mandate, which puts the EU in the odd position of having its preferred choice of 
action being subjugated to a similar international organization34. 
 The second is a framework nation option that relies on one of the five self-declared 
members (France, UK, Germany, Italy, and Greece) to take the lead in setting up a C2 in its 
capital. Each of the five countries has taken steps to allocate the assets needed to establish a 
C2 at a moments' notice, but this is a costly option nonetheless. Much of the cost comes from 
the redundancy of positions, personnel, and assets that must be maintained in the five major 
capitals. Activating one of the framework nation options also has the possibility of 
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weakening the host country's ability to act in that personnel must be pulled from within the 
national ranks in order to shore-up deficiencies in the framework C2 infrastructure35.  
 Framework nations have been unwilling to take the lead in any EU operation for just 
this reason. They are also unwilling to act because of the responsibility of being the lead 
nation in a military operation. One only needs to look at the experience of the United States 
in Iraq and Afghanistan to see why being the lead nation in a military operation that loses 
public support could be suicidal for an incumbent, democratic government. This is one 
reason why having a permanent C2 infrastructure in place in Brussels would allow the EU to 
act more freely than the member-states in conducting military operations. It would allow 
national governments to play a two-level game: allowing them to contribute to European 
security and pursue foreign policy interests, while shielding them from the public criticism of 
leading an operation. 
 The final option is for the EU's Operations Centre to create a C2 in Brussels for 
“autonomous operations of limited size (2000 troops) at short notice (5 to 20 days), 
particularly in cases where a joint civil-military response is required and no multinational 
national headquarters has been identified to conduct the operation”36. The limited size of this 
option means it cannot muster the forces necessary for anything but the smallest of 
operations. Also, at the end of these conflicts, the C2 is dismembered and staffers are sent 
back to their home countries. This limits the ability of the EU to institutionally learn from the 
mistakes of previous operations and apply the lessons to future conflicts37.  
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 There are numerous reasons why the member-states and the EU should work together 
to replace these lacking forms of C2 creation with a more permanent structure. The first is 
that EU operations are so varied and diverse that they require a permanent C2 in order to 
coordinate them effectively38. This is even doubly important for the EU, which coordinates 
both military and civilian responses to crisis (as opposed to NATO, which only conducts 
military operations).  
 The second is that current options for creating temporary C2s do not allow the EU to 
react to emerging crisis in a rapid manner39. The EU has admitted that the delay in handling 
the crisis in Bosnia only made the situation more difficult once the intervention was actually 
started. Many of the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty have been designed to decrease EU 
response time to these crises. The problem is that many of these reforms will be for naught if 
there is not a permanent C2 that can eliminate the delays inherent to the present methods of 
coordination.  
 This increase in coordination also applies to the relationship between military and 
civilian aspects of any EU PSO. Civilian operations already have a permanent C2 structure in 
the EU; if the military operations could create a permanent C2 that mirrored it, there would 
be the possibility for greater exchange and coordination between the two40. 
 The third is that it would be much more cost-effective for both the EU and its 
member-states. It would eliminate the redundancies that are littered throughout the current 
system. It would end the need for each of the 27 member-states to maintain liaison teams in 
                                                 
38
 There have been six total CSDP military operations thus far. They have performed a wide-range of tasks 
including: airport security, election security, and combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. 
 
39
 Hochleitner 2008: 27 
40
 Hochleitner 2008: 30 
  
 30
each of the five-framework nation's capitals. It would allow for better coordination of 
information, expertise, and resources; eliminating redundancies in fact-finding missions and 
military capabilities that tend to slow and handicap the ability of the EU to act. It would also 
eliminate the burdens placed upon the framework nations in the face of a crisis, allowing the 
EU to act in a position of greater strength as a truly multinational coalition. It could also 
allow for better cohesion with NATO, as each would have permanent, parallel positions 
through which joint-action and responses could be coordinated. 
 The EU would be better able to behave as a military actor if it were to develop a 
permanent command and control infrastructure. Unfortunately, the member-states themselves 
have been unwilling to cede such power to the EU4142. There is hope that through the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation, such an infrastructure can be brought into existence. The 
benefit to the EU comes through increased effectiveness of its military and civilian 
capabilities. Member-states reap the benefits of increased operational capacity (pooling 
forces and expertise) as well as cost-reducing benefits from eliminating unneeded and 
redundant aspects of their national defense. It would also drastically increase the visibility of 
EU military operations and increase the legitimacy of their action. Without the creation of a 
permanent C2 infrastructure, it is highly unlikely the EU will be able to become an efficient 
strategic actor. 
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Possible Implications of a Militarily Strong EU 
 
A militarily stronger Europe may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it would 
increase the ability of Europe to conduct the objectives set forth in the European Security 
Strategy. At the present, Europe has the ability to conduct humanitarian intervention, 
promote the spread of democracy and the rule of law, and combat terrorism; but it comes at a 
high cost. The lack of ‘smart weapons’, advanced intelligence, and network communication 
capabilities places the lives of military personnel and civilians in greater danger during an 
operation. Gaining these capabilities would help keep European personnel safe and help limit 
the collateral damage to civilians on the ground.  
It could also help strengthen the trans-Atlantic relationship with the United States. 
There are those in the European community that have heard the cries of the USA for a 
strengthened ability of Europe to defend itself and believe such action is needed to preserve 
and strengthen the transatlantic relationship. The pooling of sovereignty and resources 
necessary to achieve these improvements could also become the driving force towards a 
more deeply integrated European Union. Finally, it would allow for a Europe that is no 
longer dependent on a foreign power to insure its own defense. 
 There are several negatives aspects of a remilitarized Europe. The most prominent is 
that it could totally undermine the claim of CSDP initiatives as an exercise of ‘good’ power. 
The EU has founded its claims as being a ‘good’ international actor on the fact that it uses 
soft power rather than hard power to achieve its goals. It uses the carrot rather than the stick. 
Promising aid, support, and trade incentives are the traditional means the EU has used to be a 
international normative power. A remilitarized Europe has the possibility of threatening the 
EU’s image as a soft power, thus undermining its legitimacy as an international actor. Europe 
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currently occupies a position as an alternative to the military power exerted by the United 
States. A massive re-arming of Europe could erode this position. 
 A militarized EU could also put the organization in more danger with external 
enemies. Since the end of the Cold War, there really has not been a major threat to European 
territorial security. Part of this may be due to the fact that Europe has not become a major 
military power. If Europe does remilitarize, there is a chance it could involve itself in a 
security dilemma with those countries on its periphery. They may see the rearming of Europe 
as a threat to their own security and respond in kind. Both Russia and China may not be 
threats at the present, but they could become ones in the future if they see a rearmed Europe 
as a threat to their own security.  
Even the United States could become a potential rival for Europe as a result of 
remilitarization. This is one reason why the United States has been so adamant about 
preventing the EU from undermining the role of NATO: it would still like control over 
European security. At the moment, this is guaranteed by the Berlin Plus agreement. Yet, one 
cannot ignore that there is an inherent contradiction in asking European countries to take 
control over their own defense, while still wanting to maintain hegemony over defense on the 
continent. While Europe and the United States will most likely never see themselves as 
threats to each other’s security in the future, a rivalry could develop between the two that 
could threaten the stability of the transatlantic relationship. The seeds of this possible future 
have already been sewn in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. It would be better for the 
international community as a whole if both parties worked together to prevent it from 
devolving any further. 
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 If any of these events were to happen, would the EU’s CSDP agenda really be 
served? The CSDP was established to address crisis situations in areas of interest to the EU. 
It is designed to protect human security43 internationally with the idea that a more stable 
international community will generate greater security for Europe itself. If the capabilities 
necessary to intervene in the more large-scale operations also generate new, potentially more 
dangerous enemies; then remilitarization will have the opposite of its intended effect.
                                                 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper has examined whether the European Union is capable of becoming a 
strategic, military actor. The CSDP still faces substantial limitations in its ability to conduct 
high-risk military operations. Most of these limitations are founded in the member-states’ 
refusal to cede substantial sovereignty over military and foreign policy matters. These areas 
of sovereignty are the last important bastion of European state sovereignty and may never be 
fully under the umbrella of EU jurisdiction. 
 In the current system, the member-states themselves must be willing to conduct 
military operations and the incentive simply is not there for most. Certainly, traditional 
powers like Britain and France have expressed more willingness to conduct these types of 
operations; but it is not in the interest of most to do so. When one considers the political 
fallout of losing troops in combat situations, one can see why democratic governments would 
be unwilling to commit personnel to dangerous situations1. For a political leadership 
dependent on the will of the people for power, the loss of public support generated by combat 
deaths would be particularly undesirable. Especially for causes that are not immediate or 
even direct threats to the state itself: it would be difficult to convince the general public that 
genocide in Rwanda actually poses a direct threat to state security. This may be exacerbated 
by the fears of multi-national forces; where national troops may be placed under the 
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command and leadership of other countries. The lack of control over non-domestic military 
leaders is a risk many may well want to avoid. 
 The have been attempts to strengthen the military capabilities of the EU in conducting 
military operations, most notably through the Permanent Structured Cooperation. The PSC 
introduces increased flexibility in security pooling: allowing those that are willing to move 
forward towards greater integration without being stalled by those states unwilling to 
surrender such sovereignty. It is an important first step for the growth of the EU as a strategic 
actor. Once PSC gets moving, there is hope it could transform the capabilities of the EU in 
such a way that it could become a stabilizing force in the international security community.  
 Finally, this paper has demonstrated where the reforms have failed to strengthen EU 
military capabilities. The EU has not create a permanent command and control infrastructure. 
Without such an infrastructure, it will be impossible for the EU to efficiently coordinate its 
initiatives as a military actor. The breadth and depth of EU interventions are so varied, that 
without a permanent coordinating force, any action will continue to be mired in inefficiency. 
Even steps forward, like the PSC, cannot overcome the bigger problem that is the void of 
central command in EU military operations today. 
 With these limitations in mind, it is impossible to conclude that the EU is an 
autonomous military actor. It is not autonomous in that it is too reliant on the choices of 
others in order to decide on a course of action. In some ways, this is a positive for the 
organization: limiting itself to carrying out UNSC mandates helps strengthen the 
international community. In many ways, this reliance on others is a negative: it has no power 
to lead its member-states and it is subservient to NATO in terms of military operations.  
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 For the moment, this partnership with NATO serves a purpose: it gives the EU access 
to military capabilities and command infrastructure that it cannot generate on its own. 
Perhaps in the future, if European member-states surrender their sovereignty over national 
security, the EU can develop the capabilities necessary to be a more equal member of the 
transatlantic relationship. Once this occurs, the partnership between the EU and United States 
will be of tremendous benefit to the international community. Yet, to become an equal 
partner with the United States in terms of security, Europe and the EU must develop the 
capabilities to defend themselves and project power efficiently and effectively. It remains to 
be seen whether Europe and the EU are willing to shoulder the costs and burden of 
developing those capabilities, and whether it is in their best interest to try. 
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